Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics

Arbeitspapier

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible pension scheme and a fixed pension scheme. In a flexible pension scheme, the pension increases with short term performance as measured by the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election. This system increases social welfare by letting officeholders self-select into those activities that most benefit society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system and assess its robustness. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 12/158

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: elections ; political contracts ; vote-share thresholds ; incumbents ; selection ; effort ; Rentenreform ; Politische Entscheidung ; Politiker ; Motivation ; Wahl ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans ; Ponta, Oriana
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-007049500
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171601
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ