Arbeitspapier
Information markets, elections and contracts
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3327
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
democracy
elections
information markets
threshold contracts and triple mechanism
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Informationsverhalten
Wahlverhalten
Vertrag
Public Choice
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Müller, Markus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- Müller, Markus
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Elections, Contracts and Markets
Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
Tax Contracts and Elections
Contingent contracts in banking: Insurance or risk magnification?
Banking with Contingent Contracts, Macroeconomic Risks, and Banking Crises
The Correct Economic Interpretation of Rational Expectations : Reply
Inflation Rates and Money Growth During High-Inflations
Inflation Forecast Contracts
Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing
A Theory of Threshold Contracts
Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics
Über die Synthese und Struktur quaternärer Fluoride mit Pd(II) und Cu(II) mit einer Bemerkung zur Kristallzüchtung von Pd(SbF6)2 in wasserfreiem Fluorwasserstoff
Elections, Contracts and Markets
Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
Tax Contracts and Elections
Contingent contracts in banking: Insurance or risk magnification?
Banking with Contingent Contracts, Macroeconomic Risks, and Banking Crises
The Correct Economic Interpretation of Rational Expectations : Reply
Inflation Rates and Money Growth During High-Inflations
Inflation Forecast Contracts
Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing
A Theory of Threshold Contracts
Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics
Über die Synthese und Struktur quaternärer Fluoride mit Pd(II) und Cu(II) mit einer Bemerkung zur Kristallzüchtung von Pd(SbF6)2 in wasserfreiem Fluorwasserstoff
Elections, Contracts and Markets
Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections
Tax Contracts and Elections
Contingent contracts in banking: Insurance or risk magnification?
Banking with Contingent Contracts, Macroeconomic Risks, and Banking Crises
The Correct Economic Interpretation of Rational Expectations : Reply
Inflation Rates and Money Growth During High-Inflations
Inflation Forecast Contracts
Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing
A Theory of Threshold Contracts
Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics