Arbeitspapier

Self-serving bias and tax morale

In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: arqus Discussion Paper ; No. 174

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Subject
Evasion
Tax Morale
Tax Compliance
Self-Serving Bias
Moral Spillover

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Blaufus, Kay
Braune, Matthias
Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
Jacob, Martin
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Blaufus, Kay
  • Braune, Matthias
  • Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
  • Jacob, Martin
  • Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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