Arbeitspapier
Self-serving bias and tax morale
In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2014/18
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Subject
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evasion
tax morale
tax compliance
self-serving bias
moral spillover
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Blaufus, Kay
Braune, Matthias
Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
Jacob, Martin
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Blaufus, Kay
- Braune, Matthias
- Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
- Jacob, Martin
- Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Time of origin
- 2014