Arbeitspapier
Self-serving bias and tax morale
In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result. Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal activities.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: arqus Discussion Paper ; No. 174
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- Thema
-
Evasion
Tax Morale
Tax Compliance
Self-Serving Bias
Moral Spillover
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Blaufus, Kay
Braune, Matthias
Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
Jacob, Martin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Blaufus, Kay
- Braune, Matthias
- Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
- Jacob, Martin
- Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre (arqus)
Entstanden
- 2014