Arbeitspapier
Self-serving dictators
We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity significantly. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2008,26
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Subject
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Self-serving Bias
Experimental Economics
Dictator Game
Experimentelle Ökonomik
Gerechtigkeit
Eigeninteresse
Spieltheorie
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Asheim, Geir B.
Helland, Leif
Hovi, Jon
Hoyland, Bjorn
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Oslo
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Asheim, Geir B.
- Helland, Leif
- Hovi, Jon
- Hoyland, Bjorn
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2008
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