Arbeitspapier
Co-voting Democracy
We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are weighted according to a pre-defined key. The final decision is implemented. As this procedure gives the society – represented by the randomly-chosen subset – a better say for important decisions, the citizens might be more willing to accept the consequences of these decisions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/256
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Co-Voting
Representative Democracy
Citizen Participation
Legitimacy of Democracy
Assessment Voting
Wahlverhalten
Partizipation
Legitimität
Demokratie
Neue politische Ökonomie
Entscheidungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gersbach, Hans
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
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doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010700077
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gersbach, Hans
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2016