Arbeitspapier
Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
A player's strategy, for an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, is subjectively rational if it is a best response to his individual beliefs regarding opponents' strategies. A vector of such strategies is a subjective equilibrium if the play induced by it is realization equivalent to the play induced by each players' beliefs. Thus, any statistical updating can only reinforce the beliefs. It is shown that under perfect monitoring, the joint behavior at a subjective equilibrium approximates a behavior of a Nash equilibrium even when perturbations are allowed. Therefore, learning processes leading to subjective equilibrium result in approximate Nash behavior.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 981
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kalai, Ehud
Lehrer, Ehud
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1991
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kalai, Ehud
- Lehrer, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1991
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