Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games of incomplete information

Arbeitspapier

Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of Bayesian repeated large games that avoids some of these difficulties. To make the analysis more robust, it develops a concept of compressed equilibrium which is applicable to a general class of Bayesian repeated large anonymous games.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1562

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Thema: Anonymous games ; Nash equilibrium ; Repeated games ; Large games ; Bayesian equilibrium ; Price taking ; Rational expectations ; Anonymous games ; Nash equilibrium ; Repeated games ; Large games ; Bayesian equilibrium ; Price taking ; Rational expectations

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kalai, Ehud ; Shmaya, Eran
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97256
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ