Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Payoffs for Pure Strategies in Repeated Games

Equilibrium payoffs corresponding to subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies are characterized for infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. The equilibrium payoff set of a game is a fixed-point of set-valued operators introduced in the paper. The new operator formalism is utilized in showing the folk theorem for repeated games with unequal but constant discount rates. When the players become more patient, the equilibrium payoff set converges to the fixed-point of an asymptotic operator. This limit set corresponds to the subgame perfect equilibria of a continuous-time repeated game. It is shown that the limit set is convex, which implies that pure strategies are sufficient in obtaining all payoffs in the limit. However, this set differs from the set of all feasible and individually rational payoffs, when the discount rates are not equal. The limit sets for constant discount rates can be used in analyzing the outer limit of equilibrium payoffs when the discount factors increase but discount rates are not fixed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 98

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
repeated game
equilibrium payoff set
folk theorem
unequal discount rates
continuous-time game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kitti, Mitri
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(wo)
Turku
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kitti, Mitri
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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