Arbeitspapier
Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting
In repeated games there is in general a large set of equilibria. We also know that in the repeated prisoners dilemma there is a profusion of neutrally stable strategies, but no strategy that is evolutionarily stable. This paper investigates whether and how neutrally stable strategies can be upset in a process of mutation and selection. While neutral stability excludes that mutants have a selective advantage themselves, it does not rule out the possibility that mutants that are neutral can enter a population and create a selective advantage for a second mutant. This will be called an indirect invasion and the central results show that, for high enough continuation probability, there is no strategy that is robust against indirect invasions. Such stepping stone paths out of equilibrium generally exist both in the direction of more and in the direction of less cooperation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-115/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
Repeated games
evolutionary stability
robust against indirect invasions.
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van Veelen, Matthijs
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van Veelen, Matthijs
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2007