- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 203-254 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fox, Jeremy T.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
The Econometric Society
- (where)
-
New Haven, CT
- (when)
-
2010
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Fox, Jeremy T.
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2010
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