A note on identification of discrete choice models for bundles and binary games

Artikel

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically equivalent when we restrict attention to the class of potential games and impose a specific equilibrium selection mechanism in the data generating process. We provide new identifica- tion results for the two related models.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1021-1036 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions ; Econometrics of Games and Auctions ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Discrete choice ; demand ; binary games ; identification ; bundles ; complements ; substitutes ; entry games ; potential games

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fox, Jeremy T. ; Lazzati, Natalia
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Econometric Society
• (wo): New Haven, CT
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3982/QE489
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/195560
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ