Artikel
Matching to share risk
We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\textquotedblleft males\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft females\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits non transferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 227-251 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Microeconomics: General
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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Negatively assortative matching
risk-sharing
stable match
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Chiappori, Pierre-André
Reny, Philip J.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2016
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1914
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Chiappori, Pierre-André
- Reny, Philip J.
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2016