Artikel

Matching to share risk

We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (\textquotedblleft males\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft females\textquotedblright ) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits non transferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched couples, the more risk averse male is matched with the less risk averse female.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 227-251 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Microeconomics: General
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Subject
Negatively assortative matching
risk-sharing
stable match

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chiappori, Pierre-André
Reny, Philip J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1914
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Chiappori, Pierre-André
  • Reny, Philip J.
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2016

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