Matching platforms

Arbeitspapier

A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A matching mechanism of the platform specifies the subscription fees as well as the matching rule which determines the probability that each type of agent on one side is matched with each type on the other side. We characterize optimal matching mechanisms which induce truthful reporting from the agents and maximize the subscription revenue. We show that the optimal mechanisms for a one-to-one trading platform match do not necessarily entail assortative matching, and may employ an alternative matching rule that maximizes the extraction of informational rents of the higher type. We then study an auction platform that matches each seller to two agents, and show that the optimal mechanism entails the combination of negative and positive assortative matching.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1072

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Market Design ; Externalities ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
• Subject: assortative ; random ; auction ; subscription ; revenue maximization ; complementarity

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aoyagi, Masaki ; Yoo, Seung Han
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230478
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET