For-Profit Search Platforms

Arbeitspapier

We consider optimal pricing by a profit-maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet and bargain under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a bid-ask spread, can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary to both sides. The sum of buyers' and sellers' fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates of the marginal types and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers' and sellers' bargaining weights. We also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare enhancing.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 436

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Subject: Dynamic random matching ; two-sided private information ; intermediaries

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Niedermayer, Andras ; Shneyerov, Artyom
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2013

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17394
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94156
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17394-3
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET