Divergent platforms

Arbeitspapier

A robust feature of models of electoral competition between two opportunistic, purely office-motivated parties is that both parties become indistinguishable in equilibrium. I this short note, I show that this strong connection between the office motivation of parties and their equilibrium choice of identical platforms depends on the following two - possibly counterfactual - assumptions: 1. Issue spaces are uni-dimensional and 2. Parties are unitary actors whose preferences can be represented by expected utility functions. The main goal here is to provide an example of a two-party model in which parties offer substantially different platforms in equilibrium even though no exogenous asymmetries are assumed. In this example, some voters' preferences over the 2-dimensional issue space are assumed to exhibit non-convexities and parties evaluate their actions with respect to a set of beliefs on the electorate.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2011,25

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
• Thema: Downs Model ; Games with Incomplete Preferences ; Platform Divergence ; Knightian Uncertainty ; Uncertainty Aversion. ; Wahlkampf ; Parteiprogramm ; Median Voter ; Spieltheorie ; Präferenztheorie ; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bade, Sophie
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57490
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ