Arbeitspapier

Addictive platforms

We study competition for consumer attention, in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the "addictiveness" of its service. A more addictive platform yields consumers a lower utility of participation but a higher marginal utility of allocating attention. We provide conditions under which increased competition can harm consumers by encouraging platforms to offer low-quality services. In particular, if attention is scarce, increased competition reduces the quality of services because business stealing incentives induce platforms to increase addictiveness. Restricting consumers' platform usage may decrease addictiveness and improve consumer welfare. A platform's ability to charge for its service can also decrease addictiveness.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2022-16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Economics of Regulation
Thema
Economic models

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ichihashi, Shota
Kim, Byung-Cheol
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2022-16
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ichihashi, Shota
  • Kim, Byung-Cheol
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2022

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