Arbeitspapier

A note on central counterparties in repo markets

The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market. In another equilibrium, the repo market collapses due to aggregate cash shortage for dealers. Introducing a CCP into the repo market blocks the latter equilibrium. This stabilizing effect of a CCP is robust to idiosyncratic default risk of dealers and asymmetric information about the risk.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Discussion Paper ; No. 2012-4

Classification
Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Subject
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Financial markets
Financial stability

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Tomura, Hajime
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.34989/sdp-2012-4
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Tomura, Hajime
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2012

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