Arbeitspapier
A note on central counterparties in repo markets
The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market. In another equilibrium, the repo market collapses due to aggregate cash shortage for dealers. Introducing a CCP into the repo market blocks the latter equilibrium. This stabilizing effect of a CCP is robust to idiosyncratic default risk of dealers and asymmetric information about the risk.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bank of Canada Discussion Paper ; No. 2012-4
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
- Thema
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Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Financial markets
Financial stability
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Tomura, Hajime
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bank of Canada
- (wo)
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Ottawa
- (wann)
-
2012
- DOI
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doi:10.34989/sdp-2012-4
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Tomura, Hajime
- Bank of Canada
Entstanden
- 2012