Arbeitspapier
Migration between Platforms
We study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption externalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive stochastic opportunities to migrate to an entrant. They can accept a migration opportunity or wait for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. This provides an endogenous micro-foundation for incumbency advantage. We use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is larger.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8185
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
- Thema
-
platform migration
standardization and compatibility
industry dynamics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Biglaiser, Gary
Crémer, Jacques
Veiga, André
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Biglaiser, Gary
- Crémer, Jacques
- Veiga, André
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020
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