Migration between Platforms

Arbeitspapier

We study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption externalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive stochastic opportunities to migrate to an entrant. They can accept a migration opportunity or wait for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. This provides an endogenous micro-foundation for incumbency advantage. We use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is larger.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8185

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
• Subject: platform migration ; standardization and compatibility ; industry dynamics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Biglaiser, Gary ; Crémer, Jacques ; Veiga, André
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216581