Cooperation through Imitation

Arbeitspapier

This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom is that when agent's interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively competitive: ``keeping up with the Jones' '' lowers everyones' welfare. Here, we study the long-run consequences of imitative behavior when agents have sufficiently long memories --- and the outcome is dramatically different. Imitation robustly leads to cooperative outcomes (with highest symmetric payoffs) in the long run. This provides a rationale, for example, for collusive cartel-like behavior without collusive intent on the part of the agents.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1042

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
• Subject: Evolution ; Imitation ; Imitationsstrategie ; Nachfrageinterdependenz ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bergin, James ; Bernhardt, Dan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189323
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET