Arbeitspapier

Cooperation by Indirect Revelation Through Strategic Behavior

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The paper deals with a one-shot prisoners' dilemma when the players have an option to go to court but cannot verify their testimonies. To solve the problem a second stage is added to a game. At the first stage the players are involved in the prisoners' dilemma and at the second stage they play another game in which their actions are verifiable. In such a setup the information about the actions chosen at the prisoners' dilemma stage can be revealed through strategic behavior of the players during the second stage. A mechanism for such revelation in the extended game is described. It provides an existence of a unique sequential equilibrium, which may be obtained by an interative elimination of dominated strategies and has a number of desirable properties.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1036

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lapson, Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
1993

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lapson, Robert
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 1993

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