Arbeitspapier

Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction

In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction withthe whole population. The dynamics is driven byimitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameterscooperation will emerge if the population is large; if thepopulation is small, defection will prevail in the long run. Theresult contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that thelarger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-019/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Externalities
Thema
Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary Game Theory
Local Interaction
Gefangenendilemma
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Janssen, Maarten C.W.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Janssen, Maarten C.W.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2000

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