Arbeitspapier
Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction
In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction withthe whole population. The dynamics is driven byimitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameterscooperation will emerge if the population is large; if thepopulation is small, defection will prevail in the long run. Theresult contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that thelarger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-019/1
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Externalities
- Thema
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Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary Game Theory
Local Interaction
Gefangenendilemma
Theorie
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
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2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2000