Arbeitspapier
Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction
In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction withthe whole population. The dynamics is driven byimitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameterscooperation will emerge if the population is large; if thepopulation is small, defection will prevail in the long run. Theresult contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that thelarger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-019/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Externalities
- Subject
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Cooperation
Prisoner's Dilemma
Evolutionary Game Theory
Local Interaction
Gefangenendilemma
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2000
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