Arbeitspapier
On reciprocal behavior in prisoner dilemma game
In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine the conditions which allow that mutual cooperation constitutes the equilibrium. we particularly focus on the reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information about the payoff distortion. We show that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium with complete information and is a Bayesian equilibrium when each player believes that his opponent behaves with 'large' reciprocity in incomplete information environment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2009,072
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
- Thema
-
Reciprocity
Behavior
Cooperation
prisoner's dilemma game
Gefangenendilemma
Austauschtheorie
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Doghmi, Ahmed
Kobihy, Miloudi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Doghmi, Ahmed
- Kobihy, Miloudi
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009
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