Artikel

Communication and influence

We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that, when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately proportional to his eigenvector centrality. Third, we use our results to explain organizational phenomena such as: the emergence of work cliques; the adoption of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 649-690 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Subject
Team theory
organizations
communication
invariant method

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Prat, Andrea
de Martí, Joan
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1468
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Prat, Andrea
  • de Martí, Joan
  • Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2015

Other Objects (12)