Artikel

Communication and influence

We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that, when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, the influence of an agent on all his peers is approximately proportional to his eigenvector centrality. Third, we use our results to explain organizational phenomena such as: the emergence of work cliques; the adoption of human resources practices that foster communication (especially active communication); and the discrepancy between formal hierarchy and actual influence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 649-690 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Thema
Team theory
organizations
communication
invariant method

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Prat, Andrea
de Martí, Joan
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1468
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Prat, Andrea
  • de Martí, Joan
  • Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2015

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