Artikel

Persuasion and dynamic communication

A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule and (ii) whose solution with additional integer constraints corresponds to the optimal static rule. We present a condition--foresight--under which the optimal persuasion problem reduces to the classical maximum flow problem. This has various qualitative consequences, including the coincidence of optimal dynamic and static persuasion rules, elimination of the need for randomization, and symmetry of optimal static rules.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 99-136 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Communication
optimal persuasion rules
credibility
commitment
evidence
maximum flow problem

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sher, Itai
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE683
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Sher, Itai
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2014

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