Artikel
Influence networks and public goods
We consider a model of local public goods in a random network context. The influence network determines (exogenously) who observes whom every period and comprises a wide array of options depending on the degree distribution and the in/out-degree correlations. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium level of public good provision and compare it with the efficient level. We derive further insights for this problem by performing a comparative statics analysis.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 97-112 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
- Subject
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Influence networks
Public goods
Out-degree
In-degree
Best-shot game
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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López-Pintado, Dunia
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-016-0152-7
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- López-Pintado, Dunia
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2017
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