Artikel

An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option

This paper studies the standard version of the approval mechanism with two players in a common pool resource (CPR) extraction game. In the case of disapproval, the Nash extraction level is implemented. The paper investigates, experimentally, the extent to which the Nash threat leads to Pareto-improving extraction levels. Through our experiment, we confirm the effectiveness of the Nash threat in reducing CPR over-extraction. Although participants' behavior is mainly explained by rational thinking, inequity in payoff can also motivate their behavior. Moreover, we show that there is neither an order effect nor a framing effect. Finally, the reduction persists when the Nash threat is no longer in place.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-14 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Thema
approval mechanism
common pool resource
laboratory group behavior

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Yao, Koffi Serge William
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2021

DOI
doi:10.3390/g12040083
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Yao, Koffi Serge William
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2021

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