Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game

Artikel

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals' punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-13 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: peer punishment ; strategy method ; type classification ; public goods game ; coordination game ; weakest link game

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Albrecht, Felix ; Kube, Sebastian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g9030054
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219187
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ