Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game

Artikel

We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals' punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-13 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: peer punishment ; strategy method ; type classification ; public goods game ; coordination game ; weakest link game

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Albrecht, Felix ; Kube, Sebastian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2018

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g9030054
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219187
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET