Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Artikel

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The "standard" game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 234-256 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Public Goods
• Thema: public good ; conditional cooperation ; reciprocity ; leadership

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cartwright, Edward J. ; Lovett, Denise
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): MDPI
• (wo): Basel
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g5040234
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/167931
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ