Conditional cooperation in group contests

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants' contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This environment allows us to identify new determinants of conditional cooperation. We observe conditional cooperation in successful groups and in groups where members contribute more than rivals (even if they lose), but it vanishes in those groups that lose the contest due to low group performance. A random-effect linear panel regression analysis with an extensive set of controls confirms the findings.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CERS-IE Working Papers ; No. CERS-IE WP - 2020/42

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
• Subject: conditional cooperation ; group contest

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kiss, Hubert János ; Rosa-Garcia, Alfonso ; Zhukova, Vita
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
• (where): Budapest
• (when): 2020

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237531
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET