Arbeitspapier

Information, uncertainty, and subjective entitlements in bargaining

More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are blurred; either by lack of information about the actual performance of collaborators or because of random noise in the production process or both. These variables likely influence the surplus sharing negotiations following the production. By means of a laboratory experiment, we systematically investigate their role for the whole bargaining process from opening offers to (dis)agreements and find that uncertainties in surplus production and (even) a very coarse performance information lead to bargaining asymmetries. In addition, we find that bargainers' subjective entitlements are also influenced by performance information and the randomness inherent in the production process. These differences in subjective entitlements together with the differences in entitlements between better and worse performers influence the whole bargaining process and significantly contribute to the differences in bargaining outcomes.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3133

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Production and Organizations: Other
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Information and Uncertainty: Other
Personnel Economics: Other
Thema
bargaining
performance information
randomness in production process
entitlements
experiments
Verhandlungstheorie
Personalbeurteilung
Asymmetrische Information
Sportökonomik
Risiko
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Karagözoğlu, Emin
Riedl, Arno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Karagözoğlu, Emin
  • Riedl, Arno
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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