Arbeitspapier
Collusion and Durability
We develop a model to show that cartels that produce goods with lower durability are easier to sustain implicitly. This observation gen- erates the following results: 1) implicit cartels have an incentive to pro- duce goods with an inefficiently low level of durability; 2) a monopoly or explicit cartel is welfare superior to an implicit cartel; 3) welfare is non-monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 246
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Thema
-
cartels
collusion
durability
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Strausz, Roland
Sasaki, Dan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13306
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13306-9
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Strausz, Roland
- Sasaki, Dan
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2008
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