Arbeitspapier
Collusion via Resale
The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dominate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or post-bidding spoil-division.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 20/2008
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Thema
-
English auction
resale
collusion
Auktionstheorie
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Garratt, Rodney
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Garratt, Rodney
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2008
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Detecting collusion
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
Collusion in Auctions
Decentralization and Collusion
Gender and collusion
Collusion and Durability
Gender and Collusion
R&D-hindering collusion
Collusion in Beauty Contests
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Excess Capacity and Collusion
Algorithmic and human collusion
Detecting collusion
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
Collusion in Auctions
Decentralization and Collusion
Gender and collusion
Collusion and Durability
Gender and Collusion
R&D-hindering collusion
Collusion in Beauty Contests
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Excess Capacity and Collusion
Algorithmic and human collusion
Detecting collusion
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
Collusion in Auctions
Decentralization and Collusion
Gender and collusion
Collusion and Durability
Gender and Collusion
R&D-hindering collusion
Collusion in Beauty Contests
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Excess Capacity and Collusion