Arbeitspapier

The evolutionary robustness of forgiveness and cooperation

We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population. Moreover, we show that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate. We provide partial efficiency results for asymmetric strategies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013-5

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dal Bó, Pedro
Pujalsy, Enrique R.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(where)
Providence, RI
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dal Bó, Pedro
  • Pujalsy, Enrique R.
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2013

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