Arbeitspapier

Apparent Competition in Two-Sided Platforms

We study a platform’s design of membership and transaction fees when sellers compete and buyers cannot observe the prices and features of goods without incurring search costs. The platform alleviates sellers’ competition by charging them transaction fees that increase with sales revenue, and extracts surplus via membership fees. It prices consumers’ membership below its cost to encourage their search. Examples include malls and online marketplaces. Most malls do not charge for parking while most lease contracts include percentage rents as well as fixed rents. Online marketplaces charge sellers for membership and per transaction while letting consumers access website for free.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6660

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Nonagricultural and Nonresidential Real Estate Markets
Thema
consumer search
membership fees
retail agglomeration
transaction fees
two-sided platforms

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Guven, Gokhan
Inci, Eren
Russo, Antonio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Guven, Gokhan
  • Inci, Eren
  • Russo, Antonio
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

Ähnliche Objekte (12)