Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Lucky Break or Double Jeopardy

Arbeitspapier

We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax increase on its prices. Adding price competition, we study next how the tax affects profits. Because of the strategic implications of the cross-side external effects, the tax increase may end up increasing the profit of the taxed platform (lucky break) or, conversely, reducing it twice (double jeopardy).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5882

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Thema: two-sided platforms ; taxation ; pass-through

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Belleflamme, Paul ; Toulemonde, Eric
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141859
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ