Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Lucky Break or Double Jeopardy

Arbeitspapier

We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax increase on its prices. Adding price competition, we study next how the tax affects profits. Because of the strategic implications of the cross-side external effects, the tax increase may end up increasing the profit of the taxed platform (lucky break) or, conversely, reducing it twice (double jeopardy).

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5882

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Subject: two-sided platforms ; taxation ; pass-through

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Belleflamme, Paul ; Toulemonde, Eric
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141859
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET