Taxation in two-sided markets

Arbeitspapier

Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist's output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad-valorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1871

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kind, Hans Jarle ; Koethenbuerger, Marko ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25916
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ