Arbeitspapier

Two-Sided Platforms and Biases in Technology Adoption

We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms' incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider innovations that affect the two sides in an opposite way. We compare private incentives with social incentives and find that the bias in technology adoption depends crucially on whether the non-negative pricing constraint binds or not. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb concentration if competition authorities put more weight on consumer surplus in welfare calculations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8559

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Thema
technology adoption
two-sided platforms
non-negative pricing constraint
pass-through

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Choi, Jay Pil
Jeon, Doh-Shin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Choi, Jay Pil
  • Jeon, Doh-Shin
  • Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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