Arbeitspapier
Two-Sided Platforms and Biases in Technology Adoption
We investigate the relationship between market structure and platforms' incentives to adopt technological innovations in two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and to extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider innovations that affect the two sides in an opposite way. We compare private incentives with social incentives and find that the bias in technology adoption depends crucially on whether the non-negative pricing constraint binds or not. Our results provide a rationale for a tougher competition policy to curb concentration if competition authorities put more weight on consumer surplus in welfare calculations.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8559
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
- Thema
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technology adoption
two-sided platforms
non-negative pricing constraint
pass-through
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Choi, Jay Pil
Jeon, Doh-Shin
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
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2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Choi, Jay Pil
- Jeon, Doh-Shin
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020