Note on 'Competition in Two-sided Markets'

Arbeitspapier

We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of parameter values, a novel phenomenon arises that the platform attracts more agents from one of the groups compared with the social optimum.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 15-080/II

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Competition economics ; two-sided market

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Zeng, Yuyu ; Houba, Harold ; van der Laan, Gerard
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125082
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ