Arbeitspapier
Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-086/II
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Cooperative Games
Welfare Economics: General
- Thema
-
matching
Pareto optimal matching
contractually exchange stability
compensation stability
compensation schedule
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lazarova, Emiliya
Borm, Peter
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lazarova, Emiliya
- Borm, Peter
- Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2014