Arbeitspapier

Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems

In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractually exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensation exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-086/II

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Cooperative Games
Welfare Economics: General
Thema
matching
Pareto optimal matching
contractually exchange stability
compensation stability
compensation schedule

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lazarova, Emiliya
Borm, Peter
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lazarova, Emiliya
  • Borm, Peter
  • Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2014

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