- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
1 Online-Ressource.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Elections and Corruption: Incentives to Steal or Incentives to Invest? ; day:3 ; month:11 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-24
Studies in comparative international development ; (3.11.2023), 1-24
- Classification
-
Politik
- Creator
- Contributor
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1007/s12116-023-09412-0
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2024012212044629130261
- Rights
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:27 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Fazekas, Mihály
- Hellmann, Olli
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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