- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
1 Online-Ressource.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Elections and Corruption: Incentives to Steal or Incentives to Invest? ; day:3 ; month:11 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-24
Studies in comparative international development ; (3.11.2023), 1-24
- Klassifikation
-
Politik
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s12116-023-09412-0
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2024012212044629130261
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Fazekas, Mihály
- Hellmann, Olli
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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