Self-defeating antitrust laws: How leniency programs solve Bertrand's paradox and enforce collusion in auctions

Arbeitspapier

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise. The reduced sanctions for firms that self-report provide the otherwise missing credible threat necessary to discipline collusive agreements: they ensure that if a firm unilaterally deviates from collusive strategies, other firms find it convenient to punish it by reporting information to the Antitrust Authority.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 52. 2000

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Antitrust Law ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: Antitrust law ; leniency ; self-reporting ; cartels ; collusion ; bid-rigging ; oligopoly ; auctions ; Kartellrecht ; Kartell ; Duopol ; Oligopol ; Preiswettbewerb ; Auktionstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Spagnolo, Giancarlo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155106
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET