- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
0931-6558
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; 494
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wer)
-
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics
- (wann)
-
2013
- Urheber
-
Mouraviev, Igor
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Universität Bielefeld
Center for Mathematical Economics
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26753051
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:47 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Mouraviev, Igor
- Universität Bielefeld
- Center for Mathematical Economics
- Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics
Entstanden
- 2013
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