Arbeitspapier
Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement
We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facinguncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensivedisclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that strongerantitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions aredisclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but lesssuccessful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-010/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Business Administration: General
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- Thema
-
Antitrust
Defensive Disclosure
Patent
IBM
Patent
Kartellrecht
Rechtsdurchsetzung
USA
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bhaskarabhatla, Ajay
Pennings, Enrico
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bhaskarabhatla, Ajay
- Pennings, Enrico
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2012
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