Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement

Arbeitspapier

We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facinguncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensivedisclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that strongerantitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions aredisclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but lesssuccessful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-010/2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Law ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Business Administration: General ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• Subject: Antitrust ; Defensive Disclosure ; Patent ; IBM ; Patent ; Kartellrecht ; Rechtsdurchsetzung ; USA

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bhaskarabhatla, Ajay ; Pennings, Enrico
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Tinbergen Institute
• (where): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87196
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET