Arbeitspapier
Buying Several Indivisible Goods
This paper studies economies where agents exchange indivisible goods and money. Agents have potential use for all indivisible goods and the indivisible goods are differentiated. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities in money, have sufficient money endowments to afford any group of objects priced below their reservation values, have reservation values which are submodular and satisfy the Cardinality Condition. This Cardinality Condition requires that for each agent the marginal utility of an object only depends on the number of objects to which it is added, not on their characteristics. Under these assumptions, we show that the set of competitive equilibrium prices is a non empty lattice and that, in any equilibrium, the price of an object is between the social value of the object and its value in its second best use.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 97-20
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Quinzii, Martine
Bevia, Carmen
Silva, JosÅ A.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Davis, CA
- (when)
-
1997
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Quinzii, Martine
- Bevia, Carmen
- Silva, JosÅ A.
- University of California, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1997
Other Objects (12)
Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods
The distributive implications of patents on indivisible goods
Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
Vote buying
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint
Strategy-proof rule in probabilistic allocation problem of an indivisible good and money
A Solution to the Envy-Free Selection Problem in Economies with Indivisible Goods
Vote-buying and reciprocity
Vote-Buying and Growth
Buying votes and international organizations
Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access
Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods
The distributive implications of patents on indivisible goods
Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
Vote buying
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint
Strategy-proof rule in probabilistic allocation problem of an indivisible good and money
A Solution to the Envy-Free Selection Problem in Economies with Indivisible Goods
Vote-buying and reciprocity
Vote-Buying and Growth
Buying votes and international organizations
Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access
Afriat's Theorem for Indivisible Goods
The distributive implications of patents on indivisible goods
Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
Vote buying
Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof
Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint
Strategy-proof rule in probabilistic allocation problem of an indivisible good and money
A Solution to the Envy-Free Selection Problem in Economies with Indivisible Goods
Vote-buying and reciprocity
Vote-Buying and Growth
Buying votes and international organizations